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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper, we argue that much of the small business strategic management literature has 
drawn too heavily from work done on large, established firms. We build upon the notions of 
the liabilities of smallness and newness to discuss how microenterprises and very new firms 
are different in regards to their strategic analysis, strategic content, strategic resources, and 
strategic processes. We note that there are a number of important and non-obvious questions 
that need to be asked that have implications for the most common firms in the world, those 
that are very small. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is strategy different for very small 
businesses, including solo entrepreneurs? 
Most studies of strategic management found 
in the research literature posit theories about 
larger companies and use data sets from 
established organizations or publicly-traded 
firms.  Although there is a body of literature 
about small business strategy, for which this 
journal is a prime example, much of that 
literature draws on perspectives developed 
for large firms.  Further, a quick review of 
the leading small business management and 
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entrepreneurship texts reveals two things: a) 
strategic management occupies a small 
number of pages; and, b) most of what is 
offered in the form of strategic thinking is 
adapted from studies of large, established 
companies.  
 
In this paper, we examine the implications 
of deriving small business strategic thinking 
from big business research.  We are 
especially interested in how this might 
apply to very small and very young firms. 
Perhaps the concepts and findings from the 
broader strategy literature can easily be 
applied and there is no reason for concern. 
But it is our belief that at least some aspects 
of small business planning, strategizing and 
competitive positioning will be significantly 
different for the smallest of firms.  For 
instance, one study compared the effects of 
industry on firm performance on new and 
small versus large and established firms 
(Short, McKelvie, Ketchen & Chandler, 
2009). This research showed that industry 
impacts smaller and new firms substantially 
less than their large counterparts. The 
authors suggest that this may be due to the 
differing ways that these types of firms 
compete. Understanding how and why the 
strategic management literature may differ 
for the smallest and newest of firms is 
important in part because of the huge 
number of microenterprises and solo 
entrepreneurs. In his book Free Agent 
Nation, published in 2002, Daniel Pink 
reported that in the U.S. alone, about 25 
million citizens are self-employed (Pink, 
2002). Further, approximately 4-6% of the 
adult population joins the list of 
entrepreneurs each year (Reynolds & 
White, 1997). These numbers are growing 
and are likely far greater when considered 
as a global phenomenon. The number of 
microbusinesses that have recently been 
spurred by the surge in microlending and 
the vast amount of commerce being carried 
on in the informal economy suggests that 
there could be many millions of small 
business founders and owners who would 
benefit from a clearer understanding of 
small business strategy.  
 
To address these issues, we evaluated 
components of strategic management in 
terms of two concerns that solo 
entrepreneurs and new, very small 
businesses face: the liability of newness and 
the liability of smallness. The liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman, 
Carroll & Hannan, 1993) refers to the risks 
of failure that new firms experience because 
their organizational roles and routines are 
underdeveloped, and they lack trust 
relationships and established customers. 
These features contribute to low levels of 
legitimacy that make it relatively more 
difficult for young firms to thrive in a 
competitive environment. The liability of 
smallness refers to the risk of failure 
associated with firm size (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986; Wholey, Christenson & Sanchez, 
1992).  Because very small organizations 
typically lack economies of scale, have 
difficulty raising capital, and are relatively 
more vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
marketplace, they find it difficult to 
effectively compete.  The question we 
asked is whether the major components of 
strategy that have been useful in 
understanding larger firms—strategic 
analysis, strategic content, strategic 
assets/capabilities and strategic processes—
can also be applied to microenterprises, that 
is, solo entrepreneurs and very small firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows. In the next section, we elaborate on 
how the liabilities of newness and smallness 
might impact the manner in which a 
microenterprise views strategy. Then we 
evaluate the following components of 
strategy from the literature on strategic 
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management in large organizations:  
Strategic Analysis including SWOT 
analysis, 5-Forces analysis and Value Chain 
Analysis; Strategic Content including the 
generic strategies of cost leadership vs. 
differentiation; Strategic Assets/Capabilities 
including the resource-based view of the 
firm; and, Strategic Processes including 
entrepreneurial orientation. This is followed 
by a section in which we consider entry 
strategies, and a discussion and implications 
section that addresses future research 
directions. 
 
MICROENTERPRISES AND THE 
IMPACT OF SMALLNESS AND 
NEWNESS 
 
The focus of this inquiry is microenterprises 
and solo entrepreneurs. We find little value 
in distinguishing between the two as self-
employed entrepreneurs are regarded as a 
type of microenterprise. Given that a 
microenterprise can consist of one 
employee, the more salient question might 
be how large can a microenterprise be? This 
varies slightly in different parts of the 
world. In the U.S., the Association of 
Enterprise Opportunity regards 
microenterprises as those with 5 or fewer 
employees, including the lead entrepreneur. 
The European Union caps the number of 
employees at 10; Australia labels single-
owner businesses with up to 20 employees 
as microenterprises (Association for 
Enterprise Opportunity, 2012). In the 
developing world, we know of no defined 
limit but many involve solo entrepreneurs. 
Based on these various perspectives, we 
define microenterprises as small businesses 
with no more than 10 employees including 
the founder. In a recent year, the number of 
U.S. firms with employees that fit that 
description was approximately 4.7 million 
(U. S. Small Business Administration, 
2012). Microenterprises may have full-time 
employees, part-time employees or family 
members working in the business.  The 
enterprise itself may be a part-time or 
seasonal business. In recent years, the 
number of individuals who filed sole 
proprietor tax returns in the US—which can 
include both part time and full time 
business—has been about 23 million (U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service, 2012) 
 
We are also interested in the role that 
liability of newness might play in the 
strategic management of microenterprises. 
Prior researchers have concluded that, in 
general, new ventures remain “young” up 
until about 7-8 years of age (Biggadike, 
1976; Miller & Camp, 1985). Firms that 
survive beyond 7-8 years are regarded as 
entering maturity.  Hence, consistent with 
this age convention which can be found in 
numerous studies of new ventures (e.g., 
McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herron, 
1994; Shrader & Simon, 1997), we regard 
new ventures as those that are eight years 
old or younger.  
 
Given our definitions, it is not surprising 
that microenterprises would be vulnerable 
to liabilities of newness and smallness. 
Young firms face a number of limitations 
that can impede their ability to survive and 
thrive. Several factors contribute to an 
overarching lack of legitimacy among new 
firms—few trust relationships, poorly 
defined organizational roles, absence of 
efficient operations and established 
routines, and a general lack of experience.  
Very small firms also face a number of 
important impediments because of their 
size. Lack of financial and human 
resources, as well as the ability to access 
such resources is a common plight among 
small firms. Small firms may also find it 
difficult to achieve economies of scale or 
gain recognition as a significant player 
relative to larger firms. Such conditions are 
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likely to affect the extent to which 
microenterprises use strategic tools and 
pursue strategic initiatives.  
 
Despite these liabilities, smallness and 
newness bestow certain advantages on 
microenterprises that should not be 
overlooked. Relative to large organizations, 
very small firms may be highly flexible in 
terms of being able to make decisions and 
act rapidly. Young firms that are unfamiliar 
with the norms of an industry may be able 
to implement new practices. 
Microenterprises are often skilled at 
bootstrapping and may be able to conduct 
low cost experiments without incurring 
heavy financial losses. As such, there may 
be some settings or strategic situations in 
which smallness or newness endow 
microenterprises with a comparative 
advantage.  
 
MICROENTERPRISES AND 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
In the subsections that follow, we discuss 
the impact of newness and smallness on the 
ability of a microenterprise to analyze, 
devise and deploy strategic plans and 
actions. The discussion is divided into four 
major categories of strategic management 
activity—strategic analysis, strategic 
content, strategic assets/capabilities, and 
strategic processes. 
 
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
 
The tools of strategic analysis enable an 
organization to evaluate their status and 
performance relative to other firms, industry 
norms and trends, and conditions in the 
business environment. It is widely believed 
that by using such information, companies 
can more effectively plan new strategic 
initiatives or adapt existing strategies to 
achieve goals and reach desired future states 
(Becherer & Helms, 2009). Approaches to 
strategic analysis range from the rather 
basic, such as scoping out competitors at a 
trade show, to more complex techniques, 
such as consultant-developed formal 
business plans or intricate scenario analysis 
models.  In this section, we consider how 
solo entrepreneurs and microenterprises can 
use three such tools—SWOT analysis, 5-
forces analysis and value chain analysis—to 
enhance their strategic planning and 
decision making. 
 
SWOT Analysis. SWOT analysis is a tried-
and-true approach to evaluating an 
organization’s strengths (S), weaknesses 
(W), opportunities (O), and threats (T) 
(Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003). It is a 
tool for developing an overview of a 
company’s current strategic circumstances 
that can apply to organizations of any size. 
By examining strengths, a microenterprise 
can discover untapped potential or identify 
distinct competencies that can be leveraged 
to achieve desired results (Valentin, 2001). 
By examining weaknesses, an entrepreneur 
can identify gaps in performance, 
vulnerabilities, and erroneous assumptions 
about existing strategies. By examining 
opportunities, a firm can discover untapped 
markets, new products or new technologies, 
or identify potential avenues for 
diversification. By examining threats, a 
small business can identify unfavorable 
market shifts or changes in technology, and 
create a defensive posture aimed at 
preserving its competitive position. 
 
SWOT analysis can be highly useful for 
microenterprises wishing to take stock of 
their strategic situation and forming a 
strategy that matches the situation. Without 
additional analysis, however, such 
assessments are of little use in developing 
and enacting a strategy. Instead, the SWOT 
framework can best be used as a starting 
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point for analysis in that it provides the 
“raw material” to conduct more 
comprehensive internal and external 
analysis.  Very small firms are likely to be 
seriously constrained in terms of available 
resources and stocks of human and social 
capital.  A new firm or microenterprise 
might have a different view of its salient 
environment in terms of how it defines its 
competitors or the trends that are likely to 
affect its business model or prospects for 
success. For example, a very small software 
firm operating in a particular niche may 
have limited opportunities and fewer threats 
than a major launch developed by 
Microsoft.  Hence, SWOT analysis is 
context specific. 
 
Five Forces Analysis. Another highly 
recognizable method for assessing strategic 
conditions is known as 5-forces analysis 
(Porter, 1980). The purpose of 5-forces 
analysis is to diagnose the principal 
competitive pressures in a market and 
assess how strong and important each one 
is. The five forces are environmental forces 
that impact on a company’s ability to 
compete in a given market. They consist of 
the bargaining power of suppliers, the 
bargaining power of buyers, the threat of 
new entrants, the threat of substitutes and 
the intensity of rivalry among existing 
competitors.  Five-Forces Analysis is 
regarded as a framework for analyzing a 
particular industry because the forces are 
thought to affect all the businesses in that 
industry in a similar fashion. 
 
Because it permits a company to assess 
strategic conditions in an industry, 5-forces 
analysis is useful for crafting strategies that 
enable firms to address the influence of the 
forces. To be successful, strategy must be 
designed to cope effectively with 
competitive pressures. The analysis enables 
a firm to build a strong market position 
based on competitive advantage. A 
company whose strategy and market 
position provide a good defense against the 
five forces can earn exceptionally good 
profits even when some or all of the five 
forces are strong. Such strategizing should 
be available to small and/or young 
microenterprises, as well as firms of other 
sizes.  
 
However, some of the forces may be 
especially challenging for a very small 
business to overcome. For example, 
microenterprises may have very little 
bargaining power relative to suppliers who 
conduct a substantial part of their business 
with much larger companies (Brown & 
Butler, 1995). When a microenterprise only 
represents a small percentage of a supplier’s 
total business activity, the loss of the 
microenterprise as a customer would have 
very little impact on the supplier. Hence, 
the small business has low bargaining 
power.  Likewise, a microenterprise that has 
one or a few large buyers might be highly 
dependent on those buyers to sustain its 
viability, thus giving those buyers high 
power relative to the microenterprise.  
 
With regard to the threat of new entrants, 
smallness may provide some advantages if 
the business is highly focused on a 
particular niche. That is, the microenterprise 
may have such a unique following or 
operate in such a narrow niche that new 
entrants may have few opportunities to 
effectively compete (Cooper, Willard & 
Woo, 1986). Further, the smallness of the 
microenterprise’s niche may make 
competing in that arena unattractive for a 
new entrant.  As for rivalry among existing 
competitors, to the extent that a 
microenterprise has many similar 
competitors, smallness probably makes 
them relatively more vulnerable when dips 
in their performance or surges in the 
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success of a rival changes the dynamics of a 
given marketplace. Hence, 5-forces analysis 
can assist microenterprises in identifying 
both vulnerabilities and promising 
prospects.  
 
Value-Chain Analysis. Value chain 
analysis is another strategic tool for 
evaluating an organization’s prospects. 
Whereas 5-forces analysis is principally 
designed for external analysis of 
opportunities and threats, value-chain 
analysis is internally focused on the 
strengths and weakness that affect how well 
a firm can compete. A value chain analysis 
helps identify the activities, functions, and 
business processes that have to be 
performed in designing, producing, 
marketing, delivering and supporting 
products and services. A company’s 
competitiveness depends on how well it 
manages its value chain relative to its 
competitors. 
 
Porter’s (1985) value chain framework 
identified two elements of a strategic value 
chain. The first is labeled primary activities 
and refers to a series of actions that are 
commonly thought to add value in a 
manufacturing-type setting, that is, in a 
context where lower value raw materials are 
converted into higher value goods.  These 
include inbound logistics, operations, 
outbound logistics, sales and marketing, and 
service. The second component is referred 
to as support activities and consists of firm 
infrastructure, human resource 
management, technology development, and 
procurement. According to Porter (1985), 
support activities are vitally important and 
can be a strong source of competitive 
advantage. Because of this, organizations 
that pay too little attention to support 
activities are likely to suffer from relatively 
poorer performance.   
 
The strategic importance of value chain 
analysis derives from its usefulness in 
identifying sources of competitive 
advantage that can be leveraged, as well as 
potential weakness that may be inhibiting 
superior performance. By making up for 
resource deficits and concentrating 
resources on those activities where the 
company can gain dominating expertise, an 
organization can optimize its value 
proposition.  Unfortunately, the liabilities of 
smallness and newness place 
microenterprises at a disadvantage relative 
to most older and larger firms. To a great 
extent this is because of the analysis tool 
itself. That is, because value chain analysis 
focuses on strengths and weaknesses and 
young, small firms typically have very few 
of either, it is not a tool that shows how a 
microenterprise might best use its strategic 
resources to achieve success.  
 
For example, relative to larger firms, the 
ability of a microenterprise to add value 
through the primary activities of sales and 
marketing or service is highly constrained. 
A larger firm can devote more resources to 
sales- and service-related activity, and a 
young firm will likely have far fewer sales 
contacts and marketing opportunities. 
Further, all four of the support activities—
procurement, infrastructure, technology 
development and human resource 
management—are likely to be more highly 
developed in established firms than in 
young or small microenterprises. Hence, 
value chain analysis has very limited 
usefulness as a tool to evaluate 
microenterprises. Further, many of these 
very small firms may only focus on one 
particular part of the value chain instead of 
multiple parts. As such, they may specialize 
in one narrowly defined activity and 
collaborate with other firms who can also 
provide targeted support activities 
(Hagerdoorn, 1993). A helpful alternative 
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would therefore be an analysis method that 
assessed strategic capabilities such as the 
ability to deploy available resources or 
leverage network ties to identify and pursue 
growth opportunities.  
 
STRATEGIC CONTENT 
 
A great deal of extant work has investigated 
the strategic content of entrepreneurial 
ventures.  Perhaps the most common 
research question in this regard concerns 
whether new firms should pursue narrow or 
broad strategies (e.g. McDougall, Covin, 
Robinson, & Herron, 1994; Miller & Camp, 
1985).  A narrow strategy is pursued when a 
firm focuses on serving the needs of a 
particular customer segment or industry 
niche (Porter, 1980).  In contrast, firms 
utilizing a broad strategy extend beyond 
individual market segments or niches and 
attempt to serve an industry-wide range of 
customers (Porter, 1980).  Early scholarship 
on breadth-related strategic content 
consistently supported the notion that 
entrepreneurial firms should pursue a 
narrow strategy in order to avoid direct 
competition with large and mature firms 
(Broom, Longenecker, & Moore, 1983; 
Buchele, 1967; Cohn & Lindberg, 1974; 
Hannan, 1976; Hosmer, 1957).  However 
several follow-up studies challenged the 
prevailing wisdom and suggested that 
pursuing a broader and more aggressive 
strategy may be advantageous for new 
ventures (Biggadike, 1976; MacMillan & 
Day 1987; Miller & Camp, 1985).  
Holistically, there is a large body of work 
which investigates the effects of broad and 
narrow strategies in new and small 
ventures. 
 
However, beyond the broad versus narrow 
question, little research has been conducted 
on the applicability of traditional strategic 
content to very small and emerging 
ventures.  The strategic management 
literature has generated a number of generic 
strategies that mature firms may employ in 
competing with other firms (e.g. Herbert & 
Deresky, 1987; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; 
Miles & Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980).  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to address 
the applicability of all strategies in these 
extant classifications.  Instead, we focus on 
two of the most commonly cited generic 
strategies: low cost leadership and 
differentiation (Porter, 1980).  We identify 
the drivers of each generic strategy and 
discuss whether liabilities of newness or 
smallness prevent firms from employing 
them. 
 
Low Cost Strategic Content. A low cost 
leadership strategy is one in which firms 
derive advantages by having a lower cost 
structure than their competitors (Hill, 1988).  
From a survey of the strategic management 
literature, we have identified four primary 
drivers which facilitate a low cost structure: 
1) economies of scale, 2) economies of 
learning, 3) economies of scope, and 4) 
superior technology (Miller, 1988; Murray, 
1988; Porter, 1980).  We describe each of 
these drivers and analyze their applicability 
to new and small ventures. 
 
Economies of scale is a microeconomic 
concept referring to the reductions in unit 
cost that accompanies greater size, or 
increased production (Makadok, 1999).  
Several factors may account for the 
decrease in unit cost, including increased 
purchasing power or spreading fixed costs 
over higher volumes.  Almost by definition, 
economies of scale-related strategic content 
is the domain of larger firms for the simple 
fact that to attain the benefits one must have 
significant production magnitude.  As such, 
the liability of smallness precludes the use 
of this strategic focus (Chaganti, 1987; 
Wright & Parsinia, 1988).  The liability of 
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newness, on the other hand, is not 
necessarily at odds with economies of scale.  
For instance, a well-funded new venture 
(e.g. one with venture capital, or corporate 
backing) may achieve the size necessary to 
achieve economies of scope from inception. 
However, the vast majority of microfirms 
do not have the benefit of external funding 
and would therefore not be able to pursue 
this strategy.  
 
Economies of learning are phenomena 
whereby incremental production costs 
decline as production experience is acquired 
(Yelle, 1979); it is essentially the benefits 
that arise from ‘learning by doing’.  Several 
factors account for the decline in costs 
associated with task repetition (Gaynor, 
Seider, & Vogt, 2005).  For instance, labor 
may become more dexterous over time as 
workers make fewer mistakes, hesitate less, 
and learn short-cuts in production.  
Improved efficiencies in technologies may 
be introduced over time as users understand 
them better.  Standardization of product 
inputs and production processes may 
develop as workers and managers learn.  
Unlike economies of scale, economies of 
learning strategic content may be available 
to small firms, but generally not to 
emerging firms, who may lack the track 
record, established routines, and relevant 
experience which contribute to economies 
of learning.  
 
Whereas economies of scale refer to 
decreases in cost derived from producing 
more of a product, economies of scope 
refers to decreases in costs derived from 
producing multiple types of products 
(Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004).  Essentially, 
economies of scope may be achieved by 
product-diversified firms.  Such firms may 
reduce costs by spreading the use of 
resources across product lines.  Similar to 
economies of scale, small firms are not 
likely to have the diversity required to 
achieve economies of scope.  While it may 
be possible for microfirms to offer multiple 
products or services, diversification into 
multiple product areas is often something 
that occurs over time as part of growth.  
New firms, on the other hand, present an 
interesting context for diversification.  
While strategy research generally portrays 
diversification behavior as the domain of 
mature firms (Scott, 1971; Quinn & 
Cameron, 1983), this does not exempt new 
firms from having multiple products from 
their inception.  However, the ability of a 
new venture to diversify may also be a 
function of resource endowments. 
 
Superior technology may also contribute to 
executing low cost strategies in 
entrepreneurial ventures.  A classic example 
is the use of new technologies such as 
electric arc furnaces by mini-mills in the 
mid 1900’s to enter the market cheaply and 
compete with behemoth competition such 
as Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel 
(Christensen, 2000).  We propose that 
superior technology is unrelated to the 
liabilities of newness and smallness.  
Although researching and developing 
elaborate technologies may be beyond the 
reach of most new and small ventures, the 
adoption of new technologies, particularly 
those that are affordable, may be 
accomplished by either.  Indeed, many new 
firms are founded on the basis of unproven 
technology and many solo 
entrepreneurs/inventors may develop 
superior innovations without the benefits of 
larger organizational endowments or staff 
(O’Regan & Ghobadian, 2005;  Rosa, 
1999).  
 
Taken together, our analysis indicates that 
some of the drivers of low cost leadership 
strategies apply to new and small ventures, 
while others do not.  Specifically, 
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economies of scale and economies of scope 
may not apply to small ventures, but are 
possible for new ventures.  Conversely, 
economies of learning do not apply to new 
ventures but are possible for small ventures.  
Superior technology seems applicable to 
both new and small ventures.   
 
Differentiation Strategic Content. A 
differentiation strategy is one in which 
firms derive advantages by making the 
uniqueness of their products apparent to 
their consumers. From a survey of the 
strategic management literature, we 
identified six primary drivers of 
differentiation. They are: 1) quality, 2) 
brand image, 3) customization, 4) speed, 5) 
convenience, and 6) unique style (Miller, 
1988; Murray, 1988; Porter, 1980). We 
describe each of these drivers and analyze 
their applicability to new and small 
ventures. 
 
Of the six drivers of differentiation, four 
seem fully applicable to both new and small 
ventures: quality, customization, unique 
style, and convenience.  There is a long 
history of entrepreneurial firms who entered 
markets with high quality strategies.  For 
instance, Starbucks was founded with the 
goal of selling high quality coffee products, 
Google differentiated itself by producing 
better results than other search engines, and 
JetBlue distinguished itself by having both 
low cost and high quality in-flight amenities 
for passengers (e.g. a television in every 
seat).  Such examples attest to the fact that 
new ventures can pursue differentiation 
through high quality products.  Yet 
microfirms are not precluded from high 
quality strategies either.  Often local fruit 
stands are considered as having higher 
quality than grocery stores even though they 
are significantly smaller.  Customization 
refers to the production of products or 
offering of services which are specifically 
tailored to the preferences of the customer 
(Dewan, Jing, & Seidmann, 2003).  In many 
ways, customization is more amenable to 
small firms than large for the simple reason 
that the latter tend to target a larger 
customer base and compete on the basis of 
efficiency; customizing products for all 
would be a complex and costly undertaking 
that would suggest competing on flexibility 
(Ebben & Johnson, 2005).  For this reason, 
differentiation through customization may 
be an ideal strategy for new firms wishing 
to carve out a niche in an established 
market.  Firms differentiating themselves 
through convenience make it easier for 
customers to purchase their goods and 
services than the competition, often through 
close geographic proximity.  This is a 
common differentiator for small and new 
firms, particularly those selling relatively 
undifferentiated products or services, such 
as dry cleaners, gas stations, or liquor 
stores. Finally, firms differentiating 
themselves through unique styling provide 
products with distinctive fashion or design.  
We have no evidence that either a liability 
of newness or smallness would limit a 
firm’s ability to engage in unique styling 
differentiation. In fact, in certain industries, 
a lack of legitimacy may be an advantage 
for certain entrepreneurial design firms if 
the founders are not seen as being part of 
‘the establishment.’ Taken together, we 
believe that extant research on 
differentiation via quality, customization, 
convenience, and unique styling are 
applicable to both new and small ventures.  
Conversely, we argue that differentiation 
via brand image and speed may be limited 
by liabilities of newness and smallness, 
respectively. 
 
A brand image is the impression in the 
consumer’s mind of the qualities and 
shortcomings associated with the brand 
(Kunde, 2002).  Thus, even though a firm’s 
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product may be similar to that of 
competitors, the brand image may 
differentiate them.  Pertinent to the present 
study, brands are developed over time 
through consumers’ experiences with 
products bearing the brand and through 
advertising campaigns (Kunde, 2002).  
Because it takes time and oftentimes 
substantial resources to develop brand 
images, this route to differentiation is 
unavailable while firms endure a liability of 
newness. 
 
Speed refers to the ability of a firm to 
consistently be first to market with new 
products or services.  Achieving continual 
innovation and speedy product 
introductions generally requires significant 
research and development investments.  As 
such, we believe that the liability of 
smallness could limit the ability of 
entrepreneurs from utilizing a speed-based 
differentiation strategy.  Specifically, 
microfirms may have limited resources to 
devote towards research and development 
of new products, and therefore not be able 
to expeditiously create and launch new 
products.  However, there is evidence that 
small firms may actually be better at using 
speed to their advantage as they lack many 
of the core rigidities and structures that may 
bog down the response time to pursue 
opportunities. For instance, Chen and 
Hambrick (1995) found that many small 
firms were able to compete by sequencing 
quickly scheduled competitive moves. As 
microfirms have fewer employees and 
decision-making  often by one individual, 
there are likely to be fewer barriers to quick 
decisions.  
 
In sum, while new and small firms may be 
able to differentiate themselves via quality, 
customization, convenience, and unique 
styling, we argue that they are limited in 
differentiating themselves via brand image 
and speed. 
 
STRATEGIC ASSETS AND 
CAPABILITIES 
 
Strategy scholars as early as Penrose (1959) 
have focused on how internal firm 
capabilities effect the growth and 
performance of firms.  The Resource-Based 
View (RBV) codified a theoretical approach 
to treating the firm as a collection of 
resources (Wernerfelt, 1984), which can be 
exploited for a competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  Resources are comprised 
of a diverse set of tangible and intangible 
resources (e.g. financial, social, human and 
physical). Their usefulness stems from their 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable characteristics, and from their 
heterogeneous configurations within 
individuals firms (Barney, 1991).  While 
initially an area of study within large and 
established firms, the possession and usage 
of resources has been shown to be 
important in new and small firms as well 
(Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001).  Resources 
such as human and social capital (Wiklund 
& Shepherd, 2008), financial capital 
(Zellweger, 2007) and reputation (Sieger, 
Zellweger, Nason & Clinton, 2011) have 
been linked to entrepreneurial behavior.  In 
the context of new and very small ventures, 
the resources of the founder may also be the 
resources of the firm. As such, it may be 
difficult to separate the individual from the 
firm. 
 
The liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 
1965) and smallness (Freeman, Carrol & 
Hannan, 1983) can both be viewed from a 
resource and capability perspective.  
Specifically, the theories argue that new and 
small firms lack legitimacy and face 
difficulty creating a track record, and thus 
have a much lower survival rate than 
10 
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established firms.  The lack of legitimacy 
(itself an intangible resource) creates 
difficulties for new and small firms in 
acquiring other rare and valuable resources, 
such as financing and employees, which are 
necessary for survival and growth.  As such, 
this view of possessing key assets and being 
able to deploy them in the pursuit of 
competitive advantage seem especially 
germane for very young firms and 
microenterprises. 
 
A traditional perspective of resources may 
assume that the accumulation of more 
valuable and rare resources will necessarily 
lead to a competitive advantage, thus 
rendering small firms who control fewer 
resources at a tremendous competitive 
disadvantage.  This rather simplistic ‘bigger 
is better’ view in theorizing is quite 
common in RBV literature (e.g. Unger et 
al., 2009); however, recent empirical results 
in these research streams show that 
oftentimes less is better (Christensen, 1997; 
Bradley, Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
Bradley and colleagues (2011) demonstrate 
that while slack (excess resources) has a 
positive overall effect on growth, it has a 
negative effect on entrepreneurial 
management, which in turn has a positive 
impact on growth.  This provides a more 
nuanced view to RBV and suggests that the 
size of a firm’s resource endowments may 
not always have a clear direct positive 
benefit to firm performance.  Thus, while 
larger organizations may have greater 
absolute stocks of resources, they may face 
more significant challenges in the 
structuring, bundling and leveraging of 
those firm resources due to their more 
complex structure and administrative 
processes (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007).  
For instance, large and small organizations 
in the knowledge-based economy both 
engage in strategies aimed at generating 
critical knowledge based resources.   Large 
firms may be able to do this more quickly, 
for instance, through purchasing and 
investing in small firms.  Smaller firms, as 
they often lack the financial capital to 
purchase firms or the managerial capacity to 
integrate post-purchase (McKelvie & 
Wiklund, 2010), have to rely on the longer 
process of organically growing through 
internal projects.  However, given the less 
complex structure, smaller firms may be 
able to better internalize and apply this 
learning than larger, more diverse firms 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). 
 
Small and micro-firms in the knowledge-
based economy may also be able to access 
different types of resources and in amounts 
disproportionate to their size.  For instance, 
firms with relatively few employees can 
gain access to valuable resources through 
social networks (Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998).  
In addition, firms with few assets can also 
accumulate valuable reputation resources 
through recognition by the popular press 
and media.  By developing a large network 
or significant reputation, microenterprises 
can gain access to a larger pool of resources 
which can be exploited for competitive 
advantage and growth.  
 
New firms face a strategic asset challenge 
in that they may not have a codified firm 
level bundle of resources.  Research on the 
use of effectuation in the entrepreneurial 
process (Sarasvathy, 2001) has emphasized 
the way in which entrepreneurs use their 
individual collection of resources and the 
resources in their network to shape 
entrepreneurial opportunity and eventually 
transfer these resources into the firm.  Such 
an approach, while divergent from a 
traditional firm level strategic asset 
approach (e.g. Barney, 1991) may be more 
appropriate for microfirms and emerging 
enterprises.  Small and microenterprises 
may be similar to family firms in that there 
11 
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is a flow of resources between the firm level 
and the external individual (or family) level 
(Sharma, 2008).   
 
Not only do small and microfirms have the 
potential to expand the boundary conditions 
of resource-based theory by broadening the 
level of analysis, but the process that solo 
and emerging entrepreneurs use to identify 
and collect resources has the potential to 
shed light on the micro-foundations of 
resource-based theory (Barney, Ketchen, & 
Wright, 2011).  In fact, the heterogeneous 
nature of human capital capabilities is an 
underlying mechanism for capabilities in 
general (Foss, 2011) and further study of 
the human capital of solo entrepreneurs may 
help enrich this important dimension.   
 
Clearly, access to and control of valuable, 
rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
strategic resources is a critical challenge for 
new and small firms.  The ability of small 
and microfirms to gain access to and 
leverage these resources will be a 
determinant of their ability to survive and 
eventually grow.  However, small and 
microenterprises in the knowledge-based 
economy may actually be better suited to 
overcome the liabilities of newness and 
smallness than in the era of the industrial 
corporation.  While small firms and 
microenterprises may not directly control as 
many valuable resources, an increasingly 
inter-connected world gives firms easier 
access to valuable and rare resources.  New 
strategies such as joint-ventures, 
outsourcing (Tsang, 2002) and virtual teams 
(Montoya-Weiss, Massey & Song, 2001) 
allow new and small firms to access a 
disproportionate amount of resources than 
their size would have previously allowed.  
The resource-based processes at work in 
small and emerging firms will surely prove 
to be a valuable area of future research. 
 
STRATEGIC PROCESSES 
 
Strategic processes are distinct from 
strategic content, strategic resources, and 
strategic analysis. Strategic processes are 
more in line with “how” strategy is 
executed whereas strategic content is more 
concerned with the “what” (Bourgeois, 
1980), and strategic analysis may be seen as 
the “why” used in helping to determine the 
strategic content. To that end, strategic 
processes capture issues such as the mindset 
of the firm and its decision-making 
processes (Dess & Lumpkin, 2001) that 
help the firm to enact its purpose or carry 
out its vision (Hart, 1992).  This might 
include the continued attempts to determine 
opportunities and threats and ensuring that 
the firm is correctly positioned in the 
market in order to achieve its goals 
(Shrivastava, 1983). 
 
Much of the work on strategic processes has 
focused on the elements or dimensions of 
strategy making (Rajagopalan, Rasheed & 
Datta, 1993). Early work conducted on 
large firms began to address the modes or 
dimensions that firms displayed. For 
example, Mintzberg’s work (1973; 1978) 
examined such factors as the planning mode 
that was characterized by formal analysis, 
the adaptive mode of strategizing that took 
stakeholder concerns into consideration, 
and the entrepreneurial mode that included 
opportunity-seeking behaviors and risk-
taking. In turn, Mintzberg’s research was 
influential in subsequent work into the 
strategy-making dimensions that showed 
that three common dimensions of strategic 
processes were common to entrepreneurial 
firms: innovativeness, proactiveness, and 
risk-taking (Miller, 1983).  These three 
dimensions have now become to be widely 
viewed as the key components of a firm’s 
Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) (Covin & 
Slevin, 1989). 
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There have been over 100 empirical studies 
that have examined the relationship 
between EO and firm performance (Rauch, 
Wiklund, Lumpkin & Frese, 2009). Among 
these, EO appears to be especially 
important for understanding firm level 
outcomes for small firms (Wiklund, 1999) 
as it helps to provide insight into how the 
mindset of continuing to grow and seek 
opportunities is carried out over time. 
Interestingly, the strength of the relationship 
between EO and firm performance is 
actually higher for microfirms than for 
firms of any other size firm (Rauch, 
Wiklund, Lumpkin & Frese, 2009). The 
logic behind this is that, for the smallest of 
firms, top managers have additional ability 
and power to influence the overall direction 
of the firm as there is less reliance on others 
within the firm (i.e. middle managers, 
employees). In other words, EO is likely to 
best be carried out within microfirms in line 
with management’s aspirations. 
 
Yet, although EO is more important for 
smaller firms, there appear to be an 
important number of considerations that 
may affect microfirms ability to display 
such an orientation. For instance, carrying 
out EO activities are extremely resource 
consuming and oftentimes require 
substantial resource investments (Covin, 
1991). Further, the influence of EO is the 
highest when organizational structures are 
in place to help manage EO and firm 
decisions (Green, Covin, & Slevin, 2008). 
As such, even if microenterprises may 
desire the pursuit of an EO, they may 
struggle with implementing these strategic 
processes on account of a lack of significant 
resource endowments and developing 
organizational structures.  Simply put, even 
displaying an EO may not be possible for 
micro- and emerging firms given a lack of 
resources and routines. 
 
While certainly providing challenges for 
new and small firms, the empirical finding 
that EO is highly correlated with the 
performance of smaller firms means that 
some firms are able to meet these 
challenges. Yet, it appears as though there 
may be a tradeoff or difficult balancing act 
needed for these firms. For instance, there is 
an important trade-off in regards to the EO 
component of risk-taking. Risk-taking 
involves committing resources to endeavors 
whose outcomes are uncertain. Given a lack 
of slack resources, new and small firms may 
need to engage in calculated risk-taking in 
order to gain control over important 
resources (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978). 
Acquiring these resources may help these 
firms fuel future prosperity due to 
continuous investments into growth. Yet, 
since the outcomes of risky endeavors are 
unknown in advance, there is certainly no 
guarantee that these risks will pay off. As 
new and small firms are not likely to 
possess a resource buffer to sustain 
potential losses due to unprofitable risks, 
many of these firms are not likely to survive 
as a result (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). 
Consequentially, many new and small firms 
may succumb to their liabilities, whereas 
older and larger firms may survive as they 
have more likely acquired larger resource 
bases from which they can sustain some 
risky losses. 
 
A similar argument can be made for the 
difficult balancing act of innovativeness. 
Many new and small firms are encouraged 
to develop novel products or services 
offerings. Indeed a core strength that is 
often attributed to new and small firms is 
their ability to provide radically different 
innovations that truly alter an industry 
(Leifer et al., 2000; Christensen, 1997). 
Further, there is some research that shows 
that the capability to innovate tends to 
decrease as a venture ages (Thornhill & 
13 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 21, Number 2 
14 
Amit, 2003).  As firms age, they tend to 
develop innovations that are more closely in 
line with their existing market offerings  
and building upon their existing capabilities 
(Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Older and larger 
firms may also have to deal with core 
rigidities, the need to balance the needs of 
multiple stakeholders, and organizational 
politics that may prevent firms from 
carrying out framebreaking work (Baker & 
Cullen, 1993).  
 
Yet, while this speaks to the potential to 
innovate for micro- and new firms, there is 
also the challenge of gaining legitimacy. 
New and small firms are known to lack 
legitimacy and oftentimes are dismissed as 
not being ‘serious’ firms if they do not 
conform to the established industry norms 
and methods. Firms that are ‘too 
innovative’ compared to industry norms or 
exemplars may not be seen as legitimate 
and may therefore be ignored by the market 
as compared to the offerings of more 
established firms (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). 
Within industries, there is often a push by 
the major players to set standards and 
norms, in line with isomorphic pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 
1983). As such, there appears to be an 
additional external legitimacy concern for 
new and small firms as it concerns their 
level of innovativeness.  
 
Together, these issues show a precarious 
situation for those firms who are very new 
and very small. There appears to be an 
important balancing act in the strategic 
processes of these firms, where these firms 
need to carefully weigh the areas of risk-
taking and innovativeness with an eye to 
both fitting in with established norms, yet 
also standing out in order to earn financial 
returns. As such, there is a tradeoff in 
dedicating resources and processes related 
to implementing entrepreneurial strategic 
processes. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we have addressed the 
question of whether strategy is different for 
new and very small firms. In short, we 
answer yes, but also present a number of 
non-obvious reasons.  In discussing four 
major components of strategic management 
(strategic analysis, strategy content, 
strategic assets/capabilities and strategic 
processes), we explore the impact of the 
liabilities of smallness and newness.  We 
outline many of these issues in Table 1. At 
first glance, these liabilities would appear to 
be unduly negative, and thus constitute a 
strategic management-based logic as to why 
firms in this size and age class have a 
higher mortality rate than others 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman, et. al., 
1983). Reasons that would be particularly 
relevant include that new and small firms, 
almost by definition, have lower stocks of 
valuable resources that are critical for 
growth (Barney, 1991), they lack legitimacy 
which creates challenges in acquiring those 
critical resources such as financing and new 
employees, and that they lack bargaining 
power in relation to suppliers (Dobrev & 
Carroll, 2003).  The result of these issues is 
that microfirms and emerging enterprises 
may be seriously hindered in certain areas 
of strategic management, including creating 
challenges in establishing low-cost 
economies of scale strategies or 
differentiated strategies based on brand or 
speed.  However, once a strategy is chosen, 
small and new firms may face an inability 
to implement them.  Strategic processes, 
such as entrepreneurial orientation, 
consume a significant amount of resources, 
which are often scarce within new and 
small firms.  As a result, well intentioned 
strategic processes may be faulty, 
incomplete or ineffective.    
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Table 1: Mapping the impacts of newness and smallness on strategy 
 
 The impact of newness The impact of smallness 
Strategic Analysis 
SWOT Analysis 
5-Forces Analysis 
Value Chain Analysis 
Lack of power over supplies 
and customers may force 
firms into precarious 
competitive positions 
View of locally defined 
competitors and niche 
customers may constrain 
analyses 
May lack ability to 
conduct traditional 
analyses due to a lack of 
core strengths or 
weaknesses 
Unable to provide full set 
of activities due to lack of 
human capital 
Strategic Content 
Cost Leadership vs 
Differentiation 
New firms lack the 
experience to derive cost 
benefits from economies of 
learning 
The lack of a track record 
prevents new firms from 
differentiating themselves 
through brand image 
Smallness runs contrary to 
economies of scale and 
scope, limiting the ability 
of small firms to derive 
cost advantages.  
Limited resources in small 
firms inhibit a firm’s 
capacity to continually be 
first to market.  
Strategic 
Assets/Capabilities 
Resource-Based View 
 
Lack of legitimacy creates 
challenges in acquiring other 
valuable resources 
Lack of firm level resources 
creates a greater reliance on 
individual and firm external 
resources 
Lower stock of valuable 
resources 
Greater flexibility in the 
ability to manage resources 
Strategic Processes 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
 
New firms lack legitimacy 
and therefore may force 
them to follow industry 
norms 
Lack of track record may 
allow them to be more 
innovative 
Risk-taking is balancing 
act to ensure survival 
Lack of core rigidities and 
structures allow to quickly 
react and be proactive in 
pursuing opportunities 
Innovative launches 
oftentimes require major 
resource outlays  
 
However, this bleak picture may not tell the 
whole story.  Practically, we know that 
many firms overcome the liabilities of 
newness and smallness and go on to 
become the next generation of dominant 
players.  It was only a few years ago that 
Google, Facebook and Amazon were just 
interesting words on the pages of a business 
plan.  Empirically, we know that frame 
breaking entrepreneurial activity is often 
prevalent in young, small firms and that 
these firms can play a disruptive role in 
entire industries (Schumpeter, 1942; 
Hockerts & Wustenhagen, 2010).  We 
suggest that small firms may also benefit 
from certain strategic advantages.  As it 
concerns strategic analysis, small and micro 
firms may be able to succeed in niches 
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which may initially appear unattractive for 
larger players.  Given the strong emphasis 
placed on business planning in many new 
ventures (Delmar & Shane, 2003), they may 
be more likely to think critically about the 
competitive landscape and put to use 
strategic analysis tools in ways which large 
firms with entrenched routines and strong 
path-dependences may not (Baker & 
Cullen, 1993).  Newness and smallness may 
also allow firms to employ strategies that 
established firms simply cannot.  For 
instance, a new and small firm may be able 
to more successfully differentiate itself in a 
way that is against the industry norms, 
while established players who have helped 
to define the norm would be unable to 
replicate this approach.  While new and 
small firms almost certainly have less 
stocks of resources than large established 
firms, they may also possess less complex 
structures (Blau, 1970) and core rigidities, 
which in turn may allow them to more 
effectively deploy and manage their 
resources (Sirmon et al, 2007).  Indeed 
there is evidence that smaller firms may be 
able to better apply knowledge resources 
than large diverse firms (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005) and may be able to more 
quickly pursue subsequent opportunities 
(Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  As such, the 
liabilities of newness and smallness can 
actually lead to greater advantages in new 
and small firms.  
 
In addition to negative and positive effects 
of newness and smallness, there may simply 
be differences in the strategy of large and 
small firms.  We have largely reviewed 
small business strategy through established 
theoretical lenses developed within the 
context of large firms; however, there may 
be ways in which new and small firms 
follow different rules of the game entirely.  
The emerging theoretical and empirical 
evidence from studies on effectuation 
(Sarasvathy, 2001) show that entrepreneurs 
think and act in ways that are contrary to 
dominant mental models in traditional 
corporations (Chandler et al., 2011).  
According to an effectual approach, 
entrepreneurs often employ a creation or 
effectual logic which focuses on how to 
create value out of existing resources within 
the context of uncertain environments, 
which could include a heavier reliance on 
strategic partnerships.  This is contrary to 
the causal logic prevalent in the strategic 
planning of large firms which attempt to 
predict an optimal decision based on a set of 
assumptions.  Similarly, new and small 
firms may be more likely to engage in 
intuitive and informal strategic processes 
while large established firms may be more 
likely to use formal strategic planning 
(Allred, Adams & Chakraborty, 2007).  
Further, many new firms and 
microenterprises need to rely on 
bootstrapping in order to overcome a lack 
of resources (Winborg & Landstrom, 2011). 
This may promote entrepreneurial thinking 
such as making do with what is at hand as 
opposed to planning grandiose financing 
plans. Both strategies have advantages and 
disadvantages and the use of each may be 
better suited for their particular context. 
 
Implications for new entry. In our 
discussion, we have frequently alternated 
between young firms and small firms and 
their related management issues. One of the 
potential advantages that we attributed to 
the liabilities of newness and smallness was 
an ability to pursue subsequent 
opportunities due to fewer sunk costs and 
core rigidities. While the initial entry of a 
microfirm into a market is the focus of 
many important streams of literature, there 
is less attention paid to subsequent strategic 
changes, such as expansion into new 
markets, and launching of new products or 
services. Lumpkin and Dess (1996) refer to 
16 
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these activities as new entry1, which they 
describe as the essential act of 
entrepreneurship. 
 
One of the key ideas brought up in our 
discussion of microfirm strategy was that of 
focusing on a well-defined niche market. In 
many cases, this comes in the form of a 
very specific (local) geographic area, such 
as an individual street or a particular 
neighborhood. One advantage of this 
approach is avoiding having to face larger 
competitors head on, as larger firms may 
ignore smaller niches, or attend to more 
heavily populated geographic markets. 
Consider the distinction in focus of a street 
hot dog vendor versus a fast food restaurant 
such as McDonald’s. There appear to be a 
number of important considerations with 
regard to subsequent new entry related to 
the liabilities of newness and smallness. For 
instance, many niched firms may enter a 
parallel or geographically proximal new 
market, such as one block over from their 
current location. Yet these young and small 
firms may face persistent liabilities of 
newness and smallness even when they 
enter these nearby markets because internal 
conditions are different and they may be 
dealing with new customers. That is, even 
though their internal liabilities (routines, 
organizing) may have become established 
                                                 
1 New entry can also consist of the 
development of new organizations. 
However, this mode of new entry is very 
uncommon for new and very small firms, 
who lack the organizational structures to 
successfully manage this. Instead, an 
alternative approach to this might be seen as 
new projects or independent new firms 
started by an entrepreneur. This portfolio 
approach to owning multiple firms is 
common but moves our discussion from 
being at the firm-level to that of the 
individual level. 
in their original location, they may have 
little reputation or legitimacy to draw on in 
the new location. As such, there may be 
discrete activities that new and small firms 
may need to enact in order to convince 
external stakeholders that they are 
legitimate. While this new entry may seem 
miniscule from a large firm perspective or 
the impact of small firms on the economy, 
the risks involved may be very large for the 
microenterprise. 
 
There are similar effects for the new 
product or new service new entry as well. If 
a microfirm needs to develop new 
relationships with suppliers or distributors 
as part of diversification, then it may face 
issues of supplier power again. There is 
currently little research as to how to transfer 
legitimacy from one industry to the next, 
and therefore how legitimacy and reputation 
play a role in subsequent new entry.  
 
An important aspect of future new entry 
research is to better understand how these 
liabilities are affected in a knowledge-based 
and networked economy. One strategy that 
many new and small firms engage in is to 
develop relationships with others to 
overcome individual resource shortages. 
Yet, in the current economy where joint 
ventures, alliances, and virtual teams are 
commonplace, there is a blurring as to 
where the lines of an organization are 
drawn. Individual small firms may be seen 
as moving parts in a machine, with fewer 
physical investments and a reliance on 
knowledge capital. In such increasingly 
complex network structures or clusters of 
firms where entrepreneurs work together to 
provide individual know-how to a particular 
task at hand, knowing what a singular firm 
does itself and what it does via others may 
provide a challenge in understanding the 
strategic management of these firms. 
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In a related area, one of the motivations 
behind this paper was to better understand 
how the liabilities of newness and smallness 
affect the strategic management of 
microfirms and emerging enterprises. For 
many firms, the goals of the founder are 
paramount. Yet, prior statistics suggest that 
these firms also have a higher likelihood of 
exit and suggest that many of the founders’ 
goals are not met. From a new entry 
perspective, the question becomes what 
happens to these entrepreneurs? Do they re-
enter the market with different business 
models, strategies, and products/services in 
order to try their luck again? If so, how 
much do they alter their strategies as part of 
this re-entry? Or do these individuals pursue 
other options, such as traditional 
employment or unemployment insurance? 
There may be some national culture and 
political structure issues that may help 
define the options of these individuals, but 
the point nonetheless is what new entry 
approaches do these individuals take, if 
any?  
 
Implications for research. There are 
several topics related to our analysis which 
we believe represent fruitful opportunities 
for future research.  First, this paper 
investigated the applicability of four 
components of strategy common in the 
strategic management literature to new and 
small ventures: strategic analysis, content, 
assets/capabilities, and processes.  We 
discussed and applied a select number of 
theories and perspective only to the extent 
that they informed these relationships.  
However, future research may make the 
applicability of theories common in 
strategic management to new and small 
ventures a focal point.  A comprehensive 
discussion of how theories such as agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory, upper echelon theory, 
prospect theory, or diffusion theory 
manifest themselves differently in new and 
small ventures may provide a useful 
resource for strategic entrepreneurship 
scholars. 
 
Second, while the four components we 
investigated may account for a large portion 
of strategic management activity, we were 
limited in our ability to comprehensively 
address each component.  For example, the 
bulk of our evaluation of strategic content 
concerned low cost leadership and 
differentiation.  Yet other facets of strategic 
content include issues such as 
organizational simplicity (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1995; Miller, 1993) or the structure and 
controls used by an organization (Keats & 
O’Neill, 2001; Tempel & Walgenbach, 
2007).  An analysis similar to the one 
conducted in this paper upon such omitted 
facets of strategic analysis, content, 
assets/capabilities, and processes by future 
scholars would provide a more complete 
understanding of the relationship between 
liabilities of smallness and newness, and 
strategy. 
 
Third, we essentially treated the smallness 
and newness of a firm as dichotomous – 
firms are either small or not; new or not.  
Yet size and maturity are continuous firm 
characteristics.   We have identified in this 
paper many findings from traditional 
strategy research that do not necessarily 
apply to young and new ventures.  
However, while scholars attempt to classify 
them, firms are generally not small or new 
one day and large or mature the next.   For 
most, the progression is gradual with few 
obvious demarcations.  As part of this, 
organizations have begun to adopt a number 
of organizational forms to either ‘act big’ in 
the case of smaller firms that exude 
substantial power or also ‘act small’ in the 
case of larger firms attempting to 
circumvent organizational structural 
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constraints and politics in order to emulate 
smaller, more entrepreneurial firms. Thus, 
taking an evolutionary perspective on the 
relationship between smallness, newness, 
and strategic components may represent an 
opportunity for future work on the subject. 
 
Fourth, there is an important linkage 
between the firm and individual levels of 
analysis. For many microenterprises and 
new firms, the founder is also the most 
important employee and driving factor 
behind all of the strategic actions of the 
firm. As such, although we have discussed a 
potential lack of knowledge or legitimacy 
on behalf of the firm, the founders’ human 
capital and previous industry experience 
may in fact confer a large amount of 
knowledge and legitimacy upon the firm if 
the founder is someone with superior talent 
and reputation. One important area of 
interest in future is therefore in trying to 
understand how individual level (or team 
level) strengths or weaknesses play into the 
strategic management of the firm, and at 
what stage of firm development (age or 
size) does the reliance upon a key 
individual change.  
 
Limitations. In this review, we have 
addressed very small and new firms rather 
generally; however, it is important to 
recognize that the population of small and 
new firms is extremely heterogeneous.   
Within these broad classifications of firms, 
there may be a myriad of ways in which 
these firms implement strategy. For 
instance, the founding resources of the firm 
may have a substantial impact on its 
subsequent trajectory. Among the most 
obvious of these resources is the impact of 
financing on strategic decisions. For 
instance, an early stage venture that 
receives venture capital investment or the 
financial support of a parent firm will have 
a completely different resource endowment 
– not only financially, but also the access to 
expertise and networks.  This resource base 
has implications not only for which initial 
strategies they choose to implement, but 
also their effectiveness in resource 
consuming strategic processes such as EO. 
Perhaps more pertinent is that the receipt of 
such investment speaks to the growth 
potential of the firm and its initial 
product/service, and therefore the human 
and social capital of the founder or 
founding team.  However, while we have 
attempted to discuss microfirms and new 
ventures as being autonomous and 
independent, we acknowledge that the 
founding resources of the firms will also 
affect their strategy. We believe that those 
firms receiving external capital are more 
likely to pursue strategies in line with the 
‘large firm’ strategic management literature.  
 
Further research to understand strategy in 
very small firms should also examine the 
heterogeneous nature of small firms 
themselves.  Some important work has been 
done, for instance, identifying opportunity 
vs. necessity entrepreneurs (GEM Global 
Report, 2011), growth oriented versus small 
business oriented firms (Wiklund, 
Davidsson & Delmar, 2003), gazelles 
(Henrekson & Johansson, 2010), and micro-
enterprises (De Jong & Marsili, 2006).  
However, much further work is needed to 
identity the dimensions, such as goals, 
growth orientation, resources, and 
formality, which differentiate small firms 
from each other and how these dimensions 
may impact strategy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have argued that the 
majority of work in strategic management 
has adopted tools, concepts and processes 
that have been applied in the context of 
large, established firms. While there is a 
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rich literature on small business strategy, 
even these studies have tended to adopt the 
perspectives of the broader management 
literature. We suggest that there are 
potentially rich areas of research by 
examining the effects of liabilities of 
newness and smallness on the most 
common firms in our economy: very small 
and very new firms.  
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